I. PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS.

§ 5. CHIEF FORMS AND GENERAL ATTRIBUTES OF PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS.



1. All the contents of psychical experience are of a composite character. It follows, therefore, that psychical elements, or the absolutely simple and irreducible components of psychical phenomena are the products of analysis and abstraction. This abstraction is rendered possible by the fact that the elements are in reality united in different ways. If an element a, is connected in one case with the elements b, c, d . . ., and in another case with b', c', d' . . ., it is possible to abstract it from all the other elements, because none of them is always united with it. If, for example, we hear a simple tone, it may be located now in this direction, now in that, and it may be heard at different times in connection with various other tones. But since the direction is not constant, or the accompanying tone in all cases the same, it is possible to abstract from these variable elements, and to think of the single tone as a psychical element.

2. As a result of psychical analysis, we find that there are psychical elements of two kinds, corresponding to the two factors contained in immediate experience (§ 1, 2), namely the objective contents of experience and the experiencing subject. The elements of the objective contents we call sensational elements, or simply sensations: such are a tone, or a particular sensation of heat, cold, or light, if in each case we neglect for the moment all the connections of these sensations with others, and also all their spatial and temporal relations. The subjective elements, on the other hand, are designated as affective elements, or simple feelings. We may mention as examples, the feelings accompanying sensations of light, those accompanying sensations of sound, taste, smell, heat, cold, or pain, the feelings aroused by the sight of an agreeable or disagreeable object, and the feelings arising in a state of attention or at the moment of a volitional act. Such simple feelings are in a double sense products of abstraction for every such feeling is connected in reality with an ideational element, and it is furthermore a component of a psychical process which occurs in time during which the feeling itself is continually changing.

3. The actual contents of psychical experience always consist of various combinations of sensational and affective elements, so that the specific character of a given psychical process depends for the most part, not on the nature of its elements, so much as on the union of these elements into a composite psychical compound. Thus, the idea of an extended body, the idea of a rhythm, an emotion, and a volition, are all specific forms of psychical experience. Their character, however, is not determined by their sensational and affective elements. A psychical compound is in this respect analogous to a chemical compound. The characteristics of a chemical compound can not be defined by enumerating the properties of the elements which enter into the compound. Specific character and elementary nature of psychical processes are, accordingly, two entirely different concepts. Every psychical element is a specific content of experience, but not every specific content is at the same time a psychical element. Thus, spatial and temporal ideas, emotions, and volitional acts, are specific, but not elementary processes.

4. Sensations and simple feelings exhibit certain common attributes and also certain characteristic differences. They have in common two determinants, namely, quality and intensity. Every simple sensation and every simple feeling has a definite qualitative character; and this quality must always have some degree of intensity. Our designations of psychical elements are based entirely upon their qualities; thus, we distinguish such sensations as blue, grey, yellow, warmth and cold, or such feelings as grave, cheerful, sad, gloomy, and sorrowful. On the other hand, we always express the differences in the intensity of psychical elements by the same quantitative designations, as weak, strong, medium strong, and very strong. These expressions are in both cases class-concepts which serve for a first superficial arrangement of the elements, and each expression embraces an unlimitedly large number of concrete elements. Language has developed a relatively complete stock of names for the qualities of simple sensations, especially for colors and tones. Names for the qualities of feelings and for degrees of intensity are far behind in number and precision. Certain attributes other than quality and intensity, such as distinctness and indistinct-ness, are sometimes classed with quality and intensity as fundamental attributes. But since clearness, obscurity, etc., as will appear later (§ 15, 4), always arise from the interconnection of psychical compounds, they can not be regarded as determinants of psychical elements.

5. Made up, as it is, of the two determinants, quality and intensity, every psychical element must have a certain degree of intensity from which it is possible to pass, by continual gradations, to every other degree of intensity in the same quality. Such gradations can be made in only two directions, one we call increase in intensity, the other decrease. The degrees of intensity of every qualitative element form in this way a single dimension, in which, from a given point, we may move in two opposite directions, just as from any point in a straight line. This fact in regard to intensity may be expressed in the general statement: The various intensities of every psychical element form a continuity of one dimension. The extremities of such a continuity we call the minimal and maximal sensations, or the minimal or maximal feelings, as the case may be.

In contrast with this uniformity in intensities, qualities have more variable attributes. Every quality may, indeed, be assigned a place in a definite continuity of similar qualities in such a way that it is possible to pass uninterruptedly from a given point in this continuous series to any other point. But the various continuities of different qualities, which we may call systems of quality, exhibit differences both in the variety of possible gradations, and in the number of directions of gradation. With reference to these two kinds of variations in systems of quality, we may distinguish, on the one hand, homogeneous and complex systems, and on the other hand, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and many-dimensional systems of quality. Thus there is only one quality of pressure sensations, one of cold sensations, and one of pain sensations, while a great variety of different grades of intensity are possible for each of these qualities. It is not to be inferred from this fact that in each of these systems there is really only one quality. The truth seem rather to be that in these cases the number of different qualities either is very limited; or else we have only a very limited terminology with which to designate the differences which do exist. If we were to represent such a system geometrically, we should probably never reduce it to a single point. Thus, for example, sensations of pressure from different regions of the skin show small qualitative differences which are great enough to make it possible for us to distinguish clearly any point of the skin from others at some distance from it. Such differences, however, as arise from contact with a sharp or dull point, or from a rough or smooth body, are not to be regarded as different qualities. They always depend on a large number of simultaneous sensations, and without the various combinations of these sensations into composite psychical compounds, the impressions mentioned would be impossible.

Complex systems of quality differ from those we have been discussing, in that they embrace a large number of clearly distinguishable elements between which all possible intermediate forms exist. In this class we must include the tonal system, the color system, and the systems of smells and tastes; among the complex feeling systems we must include those which form the subjective complements of these sensational systems, such as the systems of tonal feelings, color feelings, etc. It is probable also that there belong here many systems of feelings which are objectively connected with composite impressions, but are as feelings simple in character, — such are the various feelings of harmony or discord which correspond to various combinations of tones. The differences in the number of dimensions have been determined with certainty only in the case of two or three sensational systems. Thus, the tonal system is one-dimensional. The ordinary color system, which includes the colors and their transitional qualities to white, is two-dimensional; while the complete system of light sensations, which includes also the dark color-tones and the transitional qualities to black, is three-dimensional.

6. In regard to the relations discussed thus far, sensational elements and affective elements agree in general. They differ, on the other hand, in certain essential attributes which are connected with the fact that sensations are immediately related to objects, while feelings are immediately related to the subject.

1) Sensations, when they vary in their intensity without changing at all in quality, may be arranged in a series of pure differences in intensity. Such a series of intensities varies continuously from the sensation zero in a single direction until it reaches a maximum sensation E. (OE, Fig. 1.) Feelings, on the other hand, always vary from the zero condition, in which there is no feeling, in two opposite directions: on the one hand, toward pleasurable feelings, on the other hand, toward unpleasurable feelings. These are marked G' G" in the figure, and are designated contrasting feelings. When sensations vary in their quality but continue in one and the same general qualitative dimension, they undergo purely qualitative differences and exhibit these differences always in the same direction until they reach maximal differences. Thus, for example, in the series of colors, red and green, or blue and yellow are maximal differences of a purely qualitative order. Among the tonal sensations, the deepest and highest audible tones are maximal qualitative differences of the same kind. (E' E", Fig. 1.) Every affective element, on the other hand, passes even when it is changing in its quality through a zero or indifference point (O) into a feeling of opposite quality (as is indicated in Fig. 1, G' G", by the lower arrow). This characteristic change in feelings is most obvious in those cases in which the feelings are regularly related to certain sensations, as for example in the case of tonal feelings and color feelings. As sensations, a high and low tone present differences that approach more or less the maximal differences of tonal sensation; the corresponding tonal feelings are opposites. In general, then, series of sensational qualities are bounded at their extremes by maximal differences; series of affective qualities are hounded by maximal opposites. The indifferencezone between affective opposites frequently can not be demonstrated, because, while certain feelings disappear, other affective qualities remain, or new ones may arise. The latter case appears most commonly when the passing of the feeling into the indifference-zone depends on a change in sensations. Thus, in the middle of the musical scale, those feelings disappear which correspond to the high and low tones, but the middle tones have independent affective qualities of their own which appear clearly only when the feelings for high and low tones are absent. This is to be explained by the fact that a feeling which corresponds to a certain sensational quality is, as a rule, a component of a complex affective system, in which it belongs at the same time to various dimensions. Thus, the affective quality of a tone of given pitch belongs not only to the dimension of pitch feelings, but also to that of feelings of intensity, and finally to the different dimensions in which the clang character of tones may be arranged. A tone of middle pitch and intensity may, in this way, lie in the indifference-zone so far as feelings of pitch and intensity are concerned, and yet have a very marked clang feeling. The passage of affective elements through the indifference-zone can be directly observed only when care is taken to abstract from other accompanying affective elements.

2) Feelings which have specific, and at the same time simple and irreducible quality, appear not only as the subjective complements of simple sensations, but also as the characteristic attendants of composite ideas or even of complex ideational processes. Thus. there is a simple tonal feeling which varies with the pitch and intensity of tones, and there is also a feeling of harmony which, regarded as a feeling, is just as irreducible as the tonal feeling, but varies with the character of compound clangs. Still other feelings, which may in turn be of the most various kinds, arise from melodious series of clangs. Here, again, each single feeling taken by itself at a given moment appears as an irreducible unit. Simple feelings are, for this reason, much more various and numerous than simple sensations.

3) The various pure sensations may be arranged in a number of separate systems, between the elements of which there is no qualitative relation. Sensations belonging to different systems are called disparate. Thus, a tone and a color, a sensation of heat and one of pressure, are disparate. According to this criterion, each of the four special senses (smell, taste, hearing, and sight) has a closed, complex sensational system, disparate from that of the other senses;while the general sense (touch) contains four homogeneous sensational systems (sensations of pressure, heat, cold, and pain). All simple feelings, on the other hand, form a single interconnected manifold, for there is no feeling from which it is not possible to pass to any other, through intermediate forms or through indifference-zones. But here too we may distinguish certain systems the elements of which are more closely related, as, for example, feelings which accompany colors, and those which accompany tones, harmonies and rhythms. These are, however, not absolutely closed systems, for there are everywhere relations either of likeness or of opposition to other systems. Thus, feelings such as those from sensations of moderate warmth, from tonal harmony, and from satisfied expectation, however great their qualitative differences may be, are all related in that they belong to the general class of "pleasurable feelings". Even closer relations exist between certain single affective systems, as for example, between tonal feelings and color feelings, where the feelings from deep tones seem to be related to those from dark colors, and feelings from bright colors to those from high tones. When in such cases a relationship is ascribed to the sensations themselves, it is probably due entirely to a confusion of the accompanying feelings with the sensations.

This third distinguishing characteristic shows conclusively that the source of the feelings is unitary while that of the sensations, which depend on a number of different, and in part distinguishable conditions, is not unitary. Probably this difference in the character of the sources of feeling and sensations is directly connected, on the one hand, with the relation of the feelings to the unitary subject, and, on the other hand, with the relation of sensations to the great variety of objects.

6a. It is only in modern psychology that the terms "sensation" and "feeling" have gained the meanings assigned to them in the definitions above given. In older psychological literature these terms were sometimes used indiscriminatingly, sometimes interchanged. Even yet sensations of touch and sensations from the internal organs are called feelings by physiologists, and the sense of touch itself is known as the "sense of feeling". This corresponds, it is true, to the original significance of the word, where feeling is the same as touching, and yet, after the differentiation has once been made, a confusion of the two terms should be avoided. Then again, the word "sensation" is used even by psychologists to mean not only simple, but also composite qualities, such as compound clangs and spatial and temporal ideas. But since we have the entirely adequate word "idea" for such compounds, it is more advantageous to limit the word sensation to sense qualities which are psychologically simple. Finally, the term "sensation" has sometimes been restricted so as to mean only those impressions which come directly from external sense stimuli. For the psychological attributes of a sensation, however, this circumstance is entirely indifferent, and therefore, such a definition of the term is unjustifiable.

The discrimination between sensational elements and affective elements in any concrete case is very much facilitated by the existence of indifference-zones in the feelings. Then again it follows from the fact that feelings range between opposites rather than mere differences, that feelings are much the more variable elements of our immediate experience. This changeable character, which renders it almost impossible to hold an affective state constant in quality and intensity, is the cause of the great difficulties which stand in the way of the exact investigation of feelings.

Sensations are present in all immediate experiences, but feelings may disappear in certain special cases, because of their oscillation through an indifference-zone. Obviously, then, we can, in the case of sensations, abstract from the accompanving feelings, but we can never abstract from sensations in the case of feelings. In this way two false views may easily arise, either that sensations are the causes of feelings, or that feelings are a particular species of sensations. The first of these opinions is false because affective elements can never be derived from sensations as such, but only from the attitude of the subject, so that under different subjective conditions the same sensation may be accompanied by different feelings. The second view, that feelings are a particular species of sensations, is untenable because the two classes of elements are distinguished, on the one hand by the immediate relation of sensations to objects and of feelings to the subject, and on the other hand by the fact that the former range between maximal differences, the latter between maximal opposites. Because of the objective and subjective factors belonging to all psychical experience, sensations and feelings are to be looked upon as real and equally essential, though everywhere interrelated elements of psychical phenomena. In the interrelation of the two groups of elements, the sensational elements appear as the more constant; they alone can be isolated through abstraction, by referring them to external objects. It follows therefore of necessity, that in investigating the attributes of both kinds of elements, we must start with the sensations. Simple sensations, when we consider them as abstracted from the accompanying affective elements, are called pure sensations.
 
 

References. Kant, Anthropologie, 2nd Bk. Herbart, Textbook of Psychology, § 68 and 95. (Differentiation of the concepts, sensation and feeling in the present-day sense.) Horwicz, Psychologische Analysen auf physiolog. Grundlage, 2 vols., 1872 —1878. Wundt, Über das Verhältniss der Gefühle zu den Vorstellungen, Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Philos., Ill, 1879; Essays, 1885; Grundz. 5th ed. Chap. VII.