§ 12. COMPOSITE FEELINGS.


1. In the development of temporal ideas it appears clearly that the discrimination of sensational and affective components in immediate experience is purely a product of abstraction. For time ideas the abstraction proves impossible, because, in this case, certain feelings play an essential part in the rise of the ideas. Time ideas may, therefore, be called ideas only when the final results of the process, that is, the arrangements of certain sensations in relation to one another and to the subject, are considered. When their real composition is looked into, they are complex products of sensations and feelings. They are thus to a certain extent transitional forms between ideas and those other psychical compounds which are made up of affective elements, and are designated by the general name affective processes. Affective processes resemble time ideas especially in the impossibility of an abstract separation of their affective elements from their sensation elements in any investigation of their rise. This impossibility of abstract separation is due to the fact that in the development of all kinds of affective processes, sensations and ideas are included as determining factors.

2. Intensive affective combinations, or composite feelings, must be the first affective processes discussed, because in them the characteristic attributes of the single compound are the products of a momentary state. The description of the feeling, therefore, requires only the exact comprehension of the momentary condition, not a comprehension at once of several processes occurring in time and proceeding from one stage to another. There are, on the other hand, certain relatively permanent combinations of such feelings which not infrequently appear. Such permanent combinations we call moods. These moods frequently pass into emotions and thus may be looked upon as lying on the boundary line between feelings and emotions. Such boundary forms must be classified, because of their relatively permanent character, under the composite feelings.

3. Composite feelings, then, are intensive states of unitary character in which single simple affective components are to be recognized. We may distinguish in every such feeling, component feelings and a resultant feeling. The fundamental component feelings are always simple sense-feelings. Several of these may unite to form a partial resultant which enters into the whole as a compound component.

Every composite feeling may, accordingly, be divided, 1) into a total feeling made up of all its components, and 2) into single partial feelings which go to make up the total feeling. These partial feelings are in turn of different grades according as they are simple sense-feelings (partial feelings of the first order) of feelings which are themselves composite (partial feelings of the second or higher orders). Where we have partial feelings of higher orders, complicated combinations or interlacings of the component elements may take place. A partial feeling of lower order may, at the same time, enter into several partial feelings of higher order. Such interlacings may render the nature of the total feeling exceedingly complicated. The whole may sometimes change its character, even when its elements remain the same, according as one or the other of the possible combinations of partial feelings predominates.

3a. Thus, the musical chord c e g has a corresponding total feeling of harmony, the fundamental elements of which, or partial feelings of the first order, are the feelings corresponding to the single clangs c, e, and g. Between these two kinds of feeling stand, as partial feelings of the second order, the three feelings of harmony from the double clangs c e, e g, and c g. The character of the total feeling may have four different shades according as one of these partial feelings of the second order predominates, or all are equally strong. The cause of the predominance of one of these complex partial feelings may be either the greater intensity of its sensation components, or the influence of preceding feeling. If, for example, c e g follows cb e g the effect of c e will be intensified, while if c e g follows c e a the same will hold for c g. Similarly, a number of colors may have a different effect according as one of the other partial combination predominates. In the last case, however, because of the extensive arrangement of the impressions, the spatial proximity has an influence antagonistic to the variation in the manner of combination and, furthermore, the influence of the spatial form with all its accompanying conditions is an essentially complicating factor.

4. The structure of composite feelings is, thus, in general exceedingly complicated. Still, there are different degrees of development even here. The complex feelings arising from impressions of touch, smell, and taste are essentially simpler in character than those connected with auditory and visual ideas.

The total feeling connected with outer and inner tactual sensations is designated the common feeling, since it is regarded as the feeling in which our total state of sensible comfort or discomfort expresses itself. From this point of view, the two lowest chemical senses, those of smell and taste, must also be regarded as contributors to the sensation substratum of the common feeling, for the partial feelings which arise from these two senses unite with those from touch to form unanalyzable affective complexes. In single cases one or the other of these feelings may play the chief part. But, in the midst of all this change in its sensation substratum, the common feeling is always the immediate expression of our sensible comfort and discomfort, and is, therefore, of all our composite feelings most closely related to the simple sense-feelings. Auditory and visual sensations, on the other hand, contribute to the sensation substratum of the common feeling only in exceptional cases, especially when the intensity is unusually great.

5. The common feeling is the source of the distinction between pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings. This distinction is then carried over to the single simple feelings which compose it, and sometimes even to all feelings. Pleasurable and unpleasurable are expressions well adapted to indicate the chief extremes between which the common feeling, as a total feeling corresponding to the sensible comfort or discomfort of the subject, may oscillate. Though it is to be noted that this feeling may not infrequently lie for a longer or shorter period in an indifference-zone. In the same way, these expressions, pleasurable and unpleasurable, may be applied to the single constituents which go to make up one of the total feelings. On the other hand, it is entirely unjustifiable to apply these names to all other feelings, or, as is sometimes done, to make their applicability a necessary factor in the general definition of feeling. Even for the common feeling, pleasurable and unpleasurable can only be used as general class names which include a number of qualitatively different feelings. The differences among feelings of the same class result from the very great variations in the composition of the single total feelings which we have included under the general name common feeling (cf. p. 91 sq.).

6. This fact that certain common feelings are composite in character explains why it is that there are common feelings which can not, strictly speaking, be called pleasurable or unpleasurable, because they consist in a succession of elements belonging to both classes, and under circumstances either the one kind of element or the other may predominate. Such feelings made up of partial feelings of opposite character and deriving their characteristics from this combination, may be called contrast-feelings. A simple form of such contrast-feelings among the common feelings is that of tickling. It is made up of a weak pleasurable feeling accompanying a weak external tactual sensation, and of feelings connected with muscular sensations which are aroused by the strong reflex impulses from the tactual stimuli. These reflex impulses may spread more or less, and often cause inhibitions of respiration when they reach the diaphragm, so that the resultant feeling may in different single cases vary greatly in intensity, scope, and composition.

6a. The combination of partial feelings into a composite feeling was first noticed in the case of the common feeling. The psychological laws of this combination were indeed misunderstood, and, as is usually the case in physiology, the feeling was not distinguished from its underlying sensations. Common feeling was, thus, sometimes defined as the "consciousness of our sensational state", or again as the "totality, or unanalyzed chaos of sensations" which come to us from all parts of our body. As a matter of fact, the common feeling consists of a number of partial feelings. But it is not the mere sum of these feelings; it is rather a resultant total feeling of unitary character. At the same time it is, however, a total feeling of the simplest possible composition, made up of partial feelings of the first order, that is, of single sense-feelings which generally do not unite to form partial feelings of the second or of higher orders. In the resultant feeling a single partial feeling is usually predominant. This is more especially the case when a very strong local sensation is accompanied by a feeling of pain. On the other hand, weaker sensations may determine the predominant affective tone through their relatively greater importance. This is especially frequent in the case of sensations of smell and taste, and also in the case of certain sensations connected with the regular functioning of the organs, such as the inner tactual sensations accompanying the movements of walking. Often the relatively greater importance of a single sensation is so slight that the predominating feeling can not be discovered except by directing our attention to our own subjective state. In such a case the concentration of the attention upon it can generally make any partial feeling whatever predominant.

References. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefühl. Wundt, Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung, sect. 6, and Grundz. 5th ed., vol. II, Chap. 11; Lectures, lecture 14. On Pathological Changes in the Common Feeling: Störring, Vorlesungen über Psychopathologie (1900), lectures 23 and 24.

7. The composite feelings from sight and hearing are commonly called elementary aesthetic feelings. This name includes all feelings which are connected with composite perceptions and are therefore themselves composite. As a special form of feelings belonging to the class defined by the broader meaning of the term

we have those feelings which are the elements of aesthetic effects in the narrower sense. The term elementary does not apply in this case to the feelings themselves, for they are by no means simple, but it is merely intended to express the relative distinction between these feelings and still more composite, higher aesthetic feelings. The perceptive, or elementary aesthetic feelings of sight and hearing may serve as representatives of all the composite feelings which arise in the course of intellectual processes, such as the logical, the moral, and the higher aesthetical feelings; for the general psychological structure of these complex affective forms is exactly like that of the simpler perceptive feelings, except that the former are always connected with feelings and emotions which arise from the whole interconnection of psychical processes.

While the extremes between which the common feelings move are chiefly the affective qualities which we call pleasurable and unpleasurable in the sense of personal comfort and discomfort, the elementary aesthetic feelings belong for the most part to the same affective series, but in the more objective sense of agreeable and disagreeable feelings. These latter terms express the relation of the object to the ideating subject, rather than any personal state. It is still more apparent here than in the case of pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings, that each of these terms is not the name of a single feeling, but indicates a general group, to which belong an endless variety of feelings with individual peculiarities for each single idea. In single cases, too, but more variably, the other affective series, (p. 91), namely those of the arousing and subduing feelings, or of the straining and relaxing feelings, may show themselves.

8. If we neglect for the moment this general classification, according to which the single cases are brought under the chief affective forms, the perceptive feelings may be divided into the two classes of intensive and extensive feelings, according to the relations which exist between the corresponding sensation elements and determine the quality of the feelings. By intensive feelings we mean those which depend on the relation of the qualitative attributes of the sensation elements of ideas, by extensive feelings those which arise from the spatial and temporal arrangement of the elements. The expressions "intensive" and "extensive" do not refer to the character of the feelings themselves, for the feelings are in reality always intensive, but the terms refer rather to the conditions of the rise of these feelings.

Intensive and extensive feelings are, accordingly, not merely the subjective concomitants of the corresponding ideas but, since every idea usually consists of elements which are qualitatively different and also consists of some extensive arrangement of these elements, the same idea may be at once the substratum of both intensive and extensive feelings. Thus, a visual object made up of different colored parts arouses an intensive feeling through the mutual relation of the colors and it also arouses an extensive feeling through its form. A succession of clangs is connected with an intensive feeling which corresponds to the qualitative relation of the clangs, and also with an extensive feeling coming from the rhythmical or arrhythmical temporal succession of these clangs. In this way, both intensive and extensive feelings are always connected with visual and auditory ideas, but, of course, under certain conditions one form may push the other into the background. Thus, when we hear a clang for just an instant, the only feeling perceived is the intensive feeling. Or when, on the other hand, a rhythmical series of indifferent sounds is heard, only the extensive feeling is noticeable. For the purpose of psychological analysis it is obviously of advantage to produce conditions under which one particular affective form is present and others are, so far as possible, excluded.

9. Of the intensive feelings which are to be observed in this way, those which are connected with combinations of color have the following characteristics. A given color may enter into a pleasing combination with a number of different colors which are qualitatively distinctly different from it, but in general the complementary colors do not constitute the most agreeable combination. Thus, red and blue are more agreeable when combined than are red and green. Colors which lie near to each other are always inharmonious, as, for example, blue and green. Then, too, as in the case of simple color-feelings, the effect is complicated by chance associations and the complex feelings coming from these associations (p. 87). Combinations of more than two colors have not been adequately investigated.

The feelings connected with combinations of clangs are exceedingly numerous and various. They constitute the affective sphere in which we see most clearly the formation discussed above (p. 178), of partial feelings of different orders, together with the interlacings of such feelings which arise under special conditions. The investigations of the single feelings that arise in this way is one of the problems of the psychological aesthetics of music.

10. Extensive feelings may be subdivided into spatial and temporal. Of these, the first, or the feelings of form, belong mainly to vision, and the second, or the feelings of rhythm, belong to hearing, while the beginnings of the development of both forms are to be found in touch.

The optical feeling of form shows itself first of all in the preference of regular over irregular forms, and then in the preference among different regular forms of those which have certain simple proportions in their various parts. The most important of these proportions are those of symmetry, or 1:1, and of the golden section, or x + 1 : x = x : 1(the whole is to the greater part as the greater part is to the smaller). The fact that symmetry is generally preferred for the horizontal dimensions of figures and the golden section for the vertical, is probably due to associations, especially with organic forms, such as that of the human body. This preference for symmetry and for certain simple proportions must be interpreted as signifying that the measurement of every single dimension is connected with an inner tactual sensation from the eye and with an accompanying sense-feeling which enters as a partial feeling into the total optical feeling of form. The total feeling of regular arrangement which arises at the sight of the whole form, is thus modified by the relation of the different sensations to one another, and also by the relation of the partial feelings to one another. As secondary components, which also fuse with the total feeling, there are here also associations and their concomitant feelings.

The feeling of rhythm is entirely dependent on the conditions discussed in considering temporal ideas. The partial feelings here are the feelings of strained and fulfilled expectation, which in their regular alternation constitute the rhythmical time ideas themselves. The way in which these partial feelings are united, however, and especially the predominance of special ones in the total feeling, is dependent even more than is the momentary character of an intensive feeling, on the relation in which the feeling present at a given instant stands to the preceding feelings. This is especially apparent in the great influence which every alteration in rhythm exercises on the accompanying feeling. For this reason as well as because of their general dependence on a particular temporal form of occurrence, the feelings of rhythm are direct forms of transition to the emotions. To be sure, an emotion may develop from any composite feeling, but in no other case is the condition for the rise of a feeling, as here, at the same time a necessary condition for the rise of a certain degree of emotion. The emotion is, however, usually moderated in this case, through the regular succession of feelings (cf. § 13, 1, 7).

11. The immense variety of composite feelings and the equally great variety of their conditions, render it impossible to formulate any such comprehensive, and at the same time unitary, psychological theory as that which was possible for spatial and temporal ideas. Still, there are even here some common attributes, through which composite feelings may be brought under certain general psychological heads. There are two factors which go to make up every feeling: first, the relation of the combined partial feelings to one another, and second, their synthesis into a unitary total feeling. The first of these factors is more prominent in intensive, the second in extensive feelings. In reality both factors are always united, and determine each other reciprocally. Thus, a figure which is all the time agreeable, may be more and more complex the more the relations of its parts accord with certain rules, and the same holds for a rhythm. On the other hand, the union into a single whole helps to emphasize the separate affective components. In all these respects combinations of feelings show the closest resemblance to intensive ideas. The extensive arrangement of impressions, on the contrary, especially the spatial arrangement, tends much more to favor a relatively independent coexistence of several ideas.

12. The close intensive union of all the components of a feeling, even in the case of those feelings which correspond to spatial or temporal ideas, is connected with a principle which holds for all affective processes, including those which we shall have to discuss later. This principle we can call the principle of the unity of the affective state. It may be formulated as follows: in a given moment only one total feeling is possible, or in other words, all the partial feelings present at a given moment unite, in every case, to form a single total feeling. This principle is obviously connected with the general relation between idea and feeling. For the "idea" deals with an immediate content of experience and the properties which belong to content, without regard to the subject; while the "feeling" expresses the relation which invariably exists between this content and the subject.

12a. Of all the different forms of elementary aesthetic feelings mentioned, the feelings of tonal harmony and discord are the most suitable for the purposes of psychological analysis, because of the relatively obvious character of their sensation basis. Furthermore, the interest in the study of the aesthetics of music has existed for a long time and has served to bring out a great variety of theoretical explanations of these feelings. To be sure, these explanations have not infrequently paid too little attention to the actually observable facts. They have often substituted hypothetical and purely arbitrary assumptions for observation. Such is the case when harmony is explained as an unconscious recognition of regular number relations (Euler); or when harmony is attributed to an unconscious effect of the rhythm of sound vibrations (Lipps); or finally, when harmony is attributed to the effects of tonal fusion (Stumpf). Sometimes, on the other hand, a single contributing factor is given undue prominence, as when the disturbing effect of beats is the only recognized factor in dissonance (Helmholtz). On the basis of the facts pointed out in §§ 6 and 9 we may recognize the following four conditions as those which probably have the greatest significance for the feeling of harmony. The first condition consists in the fact that there is a preference for simple divisions of the tonal line, in keeping with the principle of arithmetical division which holds for our tonal sensations. This is illustrated in the case of the major cord where the ratios are 4 : 5 : 6 (p. 57 sq., metrical principle). The second principle consists in the fact that harmonious intervals have a very characteristic relation to the difference-tones which they give. These difference-tones coincide with certain of the primary tones or else are harmonious tones of a lower octave. For example, the difference-tones in the major cord 4, 5, 6 are I, 2, that is two tones at full octaves below the first tone of the major cord. (Principle of simplicity.) The third condition consists in the coincidence of the partial tones of the clang, which coincidence increases in degree as the harmony increases. This phonic principle, as we may call it, shows itself in the relation between tones when the tones are successive, and when the tones are simultaneous it shows itself in the intensification of certain partial tones (difference-tones or over-tones) which are characteristic of the given intervals in any particular case. The fourth condition consists in the fact that beats of the primary tones, or beats of the over-tones and difference-tones, appear in the case of dissonant intervals in compound clangs. (Principle of dissonant beats).

References. On the Affective Results of Color Combinations: Goethe, Farbenlehre, Didakt. Teil, Pt. 6. Brücke, Physiologic der Farben, 1866. Kirschmann and Baker, Toronto Studies, vol. 2, 1902. On Feelings of Optical Form: Fechner, Vorschule der Aesthetik (1876), vol. I, and Abhandl. der sächs. Ges. der Wiss., vol. 14. Witmer, Phil. Stud., vol. 9. Vischer, Das optische Formgefühl, 1873. Hildebrand, Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst, 1893. Lipps, Raumästhetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen, 1897. On Clang Harmonies: Helmholtz, The Sensations of Tone, sect. 19. v. Oettingen, Harmoniesystem in dualer Entwicklung, 1866 with supplementary treatment in Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie, vols. 1—4. Stumpf, Zeitschr. f. Psych., vol. 15. Riemann, Elemente der musikalischen Aesthetik, 1900. Lipps, Psychol. Studien, 1885. Krüger, Archiv f. Psych,, vols. 1 and 2, 1903. Wundt, Grundz., 5th ed., vol. III, Chap. 16.